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RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION AND CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
CHRISTINE A. CLARK*
Florida's religious accommodation statute leads some parents to
believe that they are free to rely on spiritual healing in lieu of
medical treatment for their ill children. However, the statute fails to
protect these parents in a criminal prosecution arising from their
children's deaths. The author of this Article describes the various
types of accommodation statutes, analyzes a recent prosecution, and
concludes that such prosecutions are unconstitutional. The author
also proposes revisions to Florida's law designed to eliminate
ambiguities about what protections it provides.
A MY HERMANSON was seven years old when she died at her
home from complications related to juvenile diabetes on Septem-
ber 30, 1986. At the time of her death, she was receiving treatment
from a Christian Science practitioner and nursing care from a Chris-
tian Science nurse in accordance with the family's religious beliefs.
Her parents, Bill and Christine Hermanson, were relying on another
belief as well-the belief that Florida law protected their choice of
spiritual treatment. Their reliance was based upon a Florida statute
authorizing parents to choose spiritual means of treatment in lieu of
medical treatment.1 Despite the apparent protection offered by the
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Joseph W. Hatchett, United States Circuit Judge for the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals; B. Music, 1976, Oberlin College; M. Music, 1978, University of
Illinois; J.D., 1989, Florida State University. The author dedicates this Article to her father, the
late Florida Circuit Court Judge Harold R. Clark, who gave encouragement and inspiration for
this Article.
1. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f) (1989). The statute, numbered section 415.503(8)(f) at the
time of the trial, provides in part that:
(9) "Harm" to a child's health or welfare can occur when the parent or other per-
son responsible for the child's welfare:
(f) Fails to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or health care,
although financially able to do so or although offered financial or other means to do
so; however, a parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare legitimately
practicing his religious beliefs, who by reason thereof does not provide specified medi-
cal treatment for a child, may not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason
alone, but such an exception does not:
1. Eliminate the requirement that such a case be reported to the department [of
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statute, on November 4, 1986, Bill and Christine Hermanson were
charged with felony child abuse and felony third degree murder. 2
The Hermansons were not alone in their misplaced reliance on such
a statute. Five other prosecutions against parents who relied on spiri-
tual healing have been brought recently in California, Massachusetts,
and Arizona.' In each of these cases, the defendants relied on state
statutes accommodating spiritual healing in statutory definitions of
child abuse, neglect, or endangerment. Prosecutors, however, have
imposed unwritten limitations on these "religious accommodation
statutes" and have brought serious criminal charges, even while ac-
knowledging that the parents had been practicing their religious be-
liefs within the statutory definitions.4
Florida is one of forty-three jurisdictions5 that have enacted statu-
Health and Rehabilitative Services];
2. Prevent the department from investigating such a case; or
3. Preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child requires it, the
provision of medical services by a physician, as defined herein, or treatment by a duly
accredited practitioner who relies solely on spiritual means for healing in accordance
with the tenets and practices of a well-recognized church or religious organization.
2. State v. Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1987).
3. California: Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989); State v. Rippberger, No. 13301-C (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Aug. 4, 1989) (cited in Note, California's Prayer Healing Dilemma, 14 HASIGS CONST. L.Q.
395, 401 nn. 54-55 (1987); State v. Glaser, No. A-753942 (Cal. Super. Ct., judgment of acquittal
granted Feb. 16, 1990); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Twitchell, No. 89-210 (Mass. Sup.
Jud. Ct., May 23, 1989); Arizona: State v. King, No. CR 88-87284 (Ariz. Sup. Ct., sentenced
Sept. 26, 1989).
4. For example, for purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the State of Florida stipulated that
the Hermansons had "at all times material to the facts in this case, followed the religious teach-
ings of their church and relied upon Christian Science healing .... " Petition for Writ of Prohi-
bition and for Writ of Certiorari in Complete Exercise of Jurisdiction at 8, State v. Hermanson,
No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1987) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Prohibition].
Several commentators have speculated that these prosecutions are motivated by religious per-
secution and publicity-seeking, rather than by the ends of justice. In 1967, one defense attorney
suggested that a parent who simply did not recognize life-threatening symptoms would not be
criminally prosecuted, implying religious persecution. See Transcript of Trial at 359, Common-
wealth v. Sheridan, No. 26307 (Mass. Super. Ct., Nov. 9, 1967). One newspaper columnist,
speculating that the prosecutor wanted to add a dramatic story to a book scheduled for publica-
tion, described the prosecution of the defendants as a "legally dubious, high-profile witchhunt
against Christian Scientists." Boston Globe, June 10, 1988, at 25, col. 2.
5. Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-13-6(b), 26-14-1(2) (1986); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §
47.17.020(d) (Supp. 1988); Arizona: Atuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1974); Arkansas: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-12-502(3) (1987); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988), id. §
11165.2(b) (West Supp. 1989); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509.1 (West Supp. 1989), id. §
18950.5 (West 1980); Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-6-101 (1987), id. § 19-3-103 (Supp.
1988); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38d (West 1988); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 907 (1983), id. tit. 11, § 1104 (1987); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1356
(1988); Florida: FLA. STAT. §§ 415.503(9)(f), .504, .511 (1989); Hawaii: HAW. REv. STAT. § 350-
4 (1985); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(n)(1) (Supp. 1988), id. § 16-16(2)(c) (1979), id. §§ 18-
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tory accommodations6 for the practice of spiritual healing. Although
differing in language and effect, the statutes express a common goal
of accommodating the treatment of illness through spiritual means.
This Article examines the criminal liability of parents who rely on
these statutes and proposes statutory revisions to eliminate ambi-
guities about what protection these statutes afford. The Article ana-
lyzes Florida's religious accommodation statute, its origins, and its
recent construction and application in the Hermansons' trial. It also
discusses the different types of religious accommodation statutes na-
tionwide, with an emphasis on those states where prosecutions have
been brought. The constitutional issues raised by the application of
these statutes are also considered. Finally, this Article offers sugges-
tions to clarify the potential criminal liability of parents practicing
their religious beliefs in Florida.
This Article concludes that the prosecution of parents who choose
spiritual care in compliance with these statutes violates due process
because the statutes fail to give fair warning that such conduct will
result in criminal liability. Indeed, one of the prospective jurors at the
Hermansons' trial expressed confusion about the effect of Florida's
401(2), -1501(3) (1987); illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2054 (Smith-Hurd 1988); Indiana:
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-46-1-4(a)(1), 35-46-1-5 (Burns 1985); Iowa: IOWA CODE §§ 232.68(2)(c),
726.6(1)(d) (1989); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(1)(c) (1988); Kentucky: Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 199.011(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982); Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(5)
(West Supp. 1989); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 557 (1983), id. tit. 22, § 4010
(Supp. 1988); Maryland: MD. FAm. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-701(n)(2) (Supp. 1988); MD. HEALTH
OCC. CODE ANN. §§ 7-102(a), 14-102(2) (1986); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273,
§ 1 (West Supp. 1989); Michigan: MICH. Comnp. LAWS ANN. § 722.634 (West Supp. 1989); Min-
nesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1989); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. §
210.115.3 (Vernon 1983), id. § 568.040.2(4) (Vernon 1979), id. § 568.050.2 (Vernon Supp. 1989);
Nevada: NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.5085, 432B.020(2) (1986); New Hampshire: N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3 X1X(c) (Supp 1988), id. § 170-C:5 11 (1978), id. § 639.3 IV (1986); New
Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (West 1976); New York: N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (Mc-
Kinney 1980); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989); Ohio: Orno REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2151.421(H), 2919.22(A) (Anderson Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§§ 846A, 852A (West Supp. 1989); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 418.740(1)(e) (Butterworth
1987); Pennsylvania: 'PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1989); Rhode Island:
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1988); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFMD LAWS §§ 25-7-16, 7-17.1, 26-
10-1.1 (1984); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102(1) (1987), id. § 37-1-157(c) (1984); Utah:
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (1987); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(C) (Supp. 1989);
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-314, -371.1 (1988), id. § 63.1-248.2A2 (1987); Washington:
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (West Supp. 1989); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 49-1-
3(g)(2)(A) (1986); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West 1987); Wyoming: Wvo.
STAT. § 14-3-202(vii) (1986), id. § 35-1-201 (1988).
6. The phrase "statutory accommodation" is used in lieu of the more common "exemp-
tion" to distinguish the nature of these statutes. "Exemption" could suggest that this practice
constitutes a form of child abuse permitted by the Legislature. "Accommodation" better ex-
presses the legislative intent that the withholding of medical treatment does not constitute child
neglect when spiritual care is provided.
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statute by asking: if the statute creates an accommodation for reli-
gious practice and the Hermansons were practicing Christian Science,
"then why are we here?" 7 The answer to this question is that prosecu-
tors and courts have read a limitation into the religious accommodation
statutes by requiring that, at some point in the progression of an illness,
parents abandon their choice of spiritual care and seek medical treat-
ment. The constitutional danger inherent in applying this limitation
arises when juries are asked to determine whether state-authorized spiri-
tual healing constitutes criminal negligence.' This hindsight determina-
tion of reasonableness not only fails to give fair warning of criminal
liability, but also violates the right of free exercise of religion. 9
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The law has not always imposed a legal duty on parents to provide
their children with medical care. The first law creating such a duty
was enacted in England in 1868.10 This law stated in part that "[w]hen
any Parent shall wilfully neglect to provide adequate Food, Clothing,
Medical Aid, or Lodging for his Child . . .whereby the Health of
such Child shall have been . . . injured, he shall be guilty of an Of-
fence .... "" Reference to medical care was deleted in 1894 when
Parliament substituted the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act,12
which prohibited willful neglect resulting in "injury to [the child's]
health.''3
In the United States, while some states in the early part of the cen-
tury had statutes requiring parents to provide medical care for their
children,' 4 as late as 1968 one state's child neglect statute made no
7. Many of the references to events occurring during the course of the Hermanson trial are
based on the author's personal observations. Trial references not accompanied by footnotes are
drawn from the author's notes, which are on file at the Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives
& Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.
8. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d
112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, petition for cert. filed, 57 U.S.L.W. 3622 (U.S. Mar. 8,
1989) (No. 88-1471) (Professor Laurence Tribe, Counsel of Record), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
3186 (1989) [hereinafter Tribe Petition] ("when does continued, state-sanctioned reliance on
prayer alone cease to be a matter of faith and become a matter of criminal negligence?").
9. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Security, 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989);
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); United
States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
10. Poor Law Amendment Act of July, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 122, § 37.
11. Id.
12. 57 & 58 Vict., ch. 41.
13. Id. § 1.
14. See, e.g., California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); New York: N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1980); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West 1983).
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reference to medical care.1" As a result, a prosecution for failure to
obtain medical attention was dismissed by that state's supreme court.
16
However, in states with statutes requiring the provision of medical
care, several parents relying on spiritual healing were convicted during
the first half of the century. 17 The courts generally rejected defenses to
criminal charges based on first amendment free exercise rights.
18
Two cases brought in 1967 received widespread publicity. In Barn-
stable, Massachusetts, Dorothy Sheridan was charged with man-
slaughter for not seeking medical care for her daughter, Lisa, who
died of pneumonia. 19 The Wall Street Journal featured the case in a
front-page article, calling it a "legal landmark" because it concerned
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. 20 Sheridan had been a
member of the Christian Science church, headquartered in Massachu-
setts, for three years when her daughter developed a high fever and a
cough in early 1967. Although the fever eventually broke and the
cough abated, Sheridan nevertheless consulted a Christian Science
practitioner because she felt that Lisa's convalescence was taking too
long. After three weeks of illness, Lisa died. A jury found Sheridan
guilty of manslaughter, and she was given five years probation. The
case was not appealed. 2'
15. See MICH. Corm,. LAWS ANN. § 750.136 (West 1968) ("Any parent ... under whose
protection any child may be, who. . . unlawfully punishes, or wilfully, unlawfully or negligently
deprives of necessary food, clothing or shelter, . . . a child under 16 years of age, . . . shall,
upon conviction, be deemed guilty of a felony[.]").
16. See People v. Mankel, 373 Mich. 509, 129 N.W.2d 894 (1964); Commonwealth v. Cor-
nelius, No. 105 (Philadelphia County, Pa. Apr. 1986) (cited in Trescher & O'Neill, Medical Care
for Dependent Children: Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
203, 217 (1960)).
17. See, e.g., Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959) (involving Church of God);
People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903) (convicting Catholic of misdemeanor after
child died of pneumonia); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Crim. 110, 116 P. 345 (Crim. App. 1911).
18. See, e.g., State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904) (noting universal accep-
tance of medical care but holding that religious beliefs cannot excuse criminal act).
19. Commonwealth v. Sheridan, No. 26307 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1967).
20. Hunt, A Sect Apart: The Christian Scientists Shun Most Medicine and Social Involve-
ment, Wall St. J., July 31, 1967, at 1, col. 1.
21. Nathan Talbot, Manager of the Committee on Publications for the First Church of
Christ, Scientist, in Boston (the Mother Church) states that:
Mrs. Sheridan decided not to appeal because she did not want to experience a second
trial, in the event that the appeal was successful. In addition, even more important
from Mrs. Sheridan's standpoint, was that there was a serious legal question of
whether or not she could appeal since she was neither sentenced nor fined. The ques-
tion on the right to appeal would have had to go to the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court for determination. Some of the best attorneys in Massachusetts doubted
whether Mrs. Sheridan could take an appeal since she may not have been "convicted"
because she was neither sentenced nor fined.
Memo of Nathan Talbot, dated Nov. 22, 1989.
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In California, a misdemeanor-manslaughter prosecution was
brought against Florence Ada Arnold, who relied on prayer to heal
her daughter Sandra.2 2 Arnold was a member of the Church of the
First Born, a religious group which believes in faith healing. 23 The
manslaughter charge brought against Arnold was based on section
270, California Penal Code, which defines child neglect.24 Arnold ar-
gued that the phrase "or other remedial care" following the require-
ment to provide necessary medical attendance authorized her to rely
exclusively on the spiritual healing practice of her denomination. The
California Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding that the
phrase did not authorize unorthodox substitutes for medical treat-
ment. 25 Arnold's conviction, however, was later overturned because of
an evidentiary error.2 6
When the California Legislature amended section 270 in 1976 to ex-
pressly accommodate the choice of spiritual healing,2 7 some viewed it
as a response to Arnold and believed that parents thereafter would be
spared prosecution if their actions complied with the statute. In 1988,
the California Supreme Court overruled Arnold's interpretation of the
phrase "other remedial care," holding that it encompasses Christian
Science healing pursuant to the 1976 amendment. 28
Several states enacted accommodation statutes during the 1960s as
part of their child abuse reporting schemes. A major impetus for the
legislative accommodations came from the federal Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act, passed in 1974.29 The Act authorizes
matching funds to states enacting child abuse reporting statutes in ac-
cordance with federal guidelines.30 In 1973, the United States House
22. People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967).
23. Comment, California Penal Code's Child Neglect/Abandonment Statutes: Religious
Freedom or Religious Persecution?, 25 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 613, 613 (1985).
24. This section provided:
A father of ... a ... minor child who willfully omits without lawful excuse to fur-
nish necessary clothing, food, shelter or medical attendance or other remedial care for
his child is guilty of a misdemeanor....
In the event that the father ... is dead ... the mother shall become liable.
Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d at 443 n.2, 426 P.2d at 517 n.2, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 117-18 n.2.
25. Id. at 452, 426 P.2d at 524, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
26. Id. at 450, 426 P.2d at 522, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
27. See ch. 673, § 1, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1661 (amending CAL. PENA CODE § 270 to specify that
"[ilf a parent provides a minor with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone in accor-
dance with the tenets and practices of a recognized church or religious denomination, by a duly
accredited practitioner thereof, such treatment shall constitute 'other remedial care', as used in
this section.").
28. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, -, 763 P.2d 852, 857, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1,
6 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
30. Id.
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of Representatives' Committee on Education and Labor reported
that:
[I]t is not the intent of the Committee that a parent or guardian
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who thereby does not
provide specific medical treatment for a child is for that reason alone
considered to be a negligent parent. To clarify further, no parent or
guardian who in good faith is providing to a child treatment by
spiritual means-such as prayer-according to the tenets and
practices of a recognized church through a duly accredited
practitioner shall for that reason alone be considered to have
neglected the child."
The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health, Ed-
ucation, and Welfare (HEW) to promulgate regulations, including
statutory guidelines, for implementation of the Act.32 The original
HEW guidelines, announced on December 19, 1974, included a model
religious accommodation provision:
"Harm or threatened harm to a child's health or welfare" can occur
through: Non-accidental physical or mental injury; sexual abuse, as
defined by State law; or negligent treatment or maltreatment,
including the failure to provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter.
Provided, however, that a parent or guardian legitimately practicing
his religious beliefs who thereby does not provide specified medical
treatment for a child, for that reason alone shall not be considered a
negligent parent or guardian; However, such an exception shall not
preclude a court from ordering that medical services be provided to
the child, where his health requires it. 33
While the regulations do not require states to adopt the identical lan-
guage of the guidelines defining "child abuse and neglect," they do
oblige the states to provide a definition with the same substance.3 4
The original guidelines' definition of harm included the failure to
provide food, clothing or shelter, but not medical care. 5 Although
some states included language defining neglect as failure to provide
medical or health care,36 the guidelines did not require this provision
31. H.R. REP. No. 685, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1973) (emphasis in original).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 5106 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
33. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1974) (emphasis in original).
34. Id. § 1340.3-3.
35. Id. § 1340.1-2(b)(1).
36. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1986); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §12-
12-502(3) (1987); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.011(6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982);
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(5) (West Supp. 1989).
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for eligibility under the Act.17 After soliciting comments on the inclu-
sion of medical care, in 1987 the Department of Health and Human
Services revised the definition of neglect to include the failure to pro-
vide medical care. 38 The guidelines were also revised to delete the re-
quirement that states provide an accommodation for religion.3 9 The
guidelines require, however, that if the State does provide a religious
accommodation, the reporting scheme must "not limit the administra-
tive or judicial authority of the State to ensure that medical services
are provided to the child when his health requires it. "40
II. FLORIDA's RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION STATUTE
Section 415.503(3), Florida Statutes, defines "child abuse or ne-
glect" as "harm or threatened harm to a child's physical or mental
health or welfare by the acts or omissions of the parent or other per-
son responsible for the child's welfare."'" The nature of "harm" con-
stituting child abuse is described as the failure "to supply the child
with . . . health care .... ,,42 The statute further provides that
"harm" does not arise when spiritual care is provided in lieu of medi-
cal treatment: "a parent or other person responsible for the child's
welfare legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, who by reason
thereof does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, may
not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason alone . . . . 43
While spiritual healing in lieu of medical care is not labeled as abuse
under the statute, the statute requires that such cases be reported to
Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS). 4
HRS may investigate any case so reported, and when the health of the
child requires it, a court may order the provision of either medical
services or "treatment by a duly accredited practitioner who relies
solely on spiritual means for healing in accordance with the tenets and
practices of a well-recognized church or religious organization. '45
Hypothetically, the statute authorizes the courts to order Christian
Science care "by a duly accredited practitioner."
37. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.1-2(b)(1) (1974).
38. See id. § 1340.2(d)(2)(i) (1987). The name of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare was changed to the Department of Health and Human Services in 1979.
39. Id.
40. Id. § 1340.2(d)(2)(ii).
41. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(3) (1989).
42. Id. § 415.503(9)(f). For the text of the statute, see supra note 1.
43. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f) (1989).
44. Id. § 415.504 (requiring Christian Science practitioners to report incidents of child
abuse, and therefore arguably requiring reporting of all cases where parents rely on spiritual
treatment in accordance with section 415.503(9)(f)).
45. Id. § 415.503(9)(f)(3).
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A. Legislative History
In 1975, the Florida Senate and House of Representatives passed
the religious accommodation provision of section 415.503, Florida
Statutes, by a unanimous vote. 46 Speaking before the Senate Judici-
ary-Criminal Committee, Senator Richard Deeb 47 described the reli-
gious accommodation bill48 as "providing a defense for parents who
decline medical treatment because [of their] religion." '49 The section
also was amended to require immediate notification to the State At-
torney's office of all reports of physical abuse. 0 By adopting a notifi-
cation requirement, the Committee intended primarily to comply with
the federal guidelines promulgated pursuant to the Child Abuse Pre-
vention and Treatment Act,"' thereby ensuring Florida's receipt of
federal matching dollars. The accommodation provision apparently
was uncontroversial, as it drew no comment in the hearings.52
In 1988 the Legislature heightened the protection of the accommo-
dation statute through the amendment of section 415.511, entitled
"Immunity from liability in cases of child abuse or neglect."
(])(a) Any person, official, or institution participating in good faith
in any act authorized or required by ss. 415.502-415.514 shall be
immune from any civil or criminal liability which might otherwise
result by reason of such action.
(b) Except as provided in s. 415.503(8)(f) [renumbered as
415.503(9)(f)], nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to
grant immunity, civil or criminal, to any person suspected of having
abused or neglected a child, or committed any illegal act upon or
against a child. 5 3
46. Fla. S. Jour. 440 (Reg. Sess. 1975).
47. Repub., St. Petersburg, 1966-76.
48. Fla. SB 332 (1978).
49. Fla. S., Comm. on Judiciary-Crim., tape recording of proceedings (May 26, 1975)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
According to a California legislative analysis, this type of provision would shield parents from
liability "for failing to provide for the health of the child because they choose treatment by
prayer rather than common medical treatment." Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d at -,
763 P.2d at 858, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 6 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989) (quoting Assem-
bly Office of Research, 3d Reading Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3843 (1975-76 Reg. Sess.)).
50. Ch. 75-185, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 354, 355-56.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1982 & Supp. 1988).
52. See Fla. S., Comm. on Judiciary-Crim., tape recording of proceedings (May 26, 1975);
see also Fla. S., Comm. on HRS, tape recording of proceedings (May 9, 1975 & May 13, 1975)
(available at Fla. Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Ar-
chives, Tallahassee, Fla.).
53. Ch. 88-337, § 27, 1988 Fla. Laws 1781 (adding italicized language) (codified as amended
at FLA. STAT. § 415.511 (1989)). Subsection (a) provides civil and criminal immunity for persons
whose acts are authorized or required under the statute. It primarily protects teachers, physicians
and all others reporting abuse from legal retaliation for their actions.
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The 1988 amendment adding the italicized language clarifies the
original provision by expressly including section 415.503(9)(f) in the
authorized acts entitled to immunity from criminal liability. This pro-
vision ensures that a child abuser cannot be protected by performing
some act authorized by the statute, such as reporting a case of child
abuse to HRS. By specifically naming the religious accommodation
provision in the amendment, the Legislature signified its intent that
this provision offers not merely a defense, but immunity from prose-
cution for those whose conduct falls under section 415.503(9)(0. 4
B. Application of the Statute in the Hermansons' Trial
Although the plain language of the accommodation statute strongly
suggests that the Hermansons' choice of treatment was statutorily
protected, Bill and Christine Hermanson were tried for felony child
abuse" and felony third degree murder16 after Amy died in 1986.
As Christian Scientists, the Hermansons study and follow the teach-
ings of Christian Science's founder, Mary Baker Eddy. In 1875, Eddy
published the first edition of the Christian Science textbook5 7 Science
and Health with Key to the Scriptures,5 8 which contains her own inter-
pretation of Biblical truth and testimonial accounts by individuals
who attribute their own healings to Christian Science.
At the heart of Christian Science doctrine is the belief that disease is
a false sense of reality-thought externalized.59 Christian Science di-
54. The Florida Legislature has enacted a variety of statutory grants of immunity. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 817.564(6) (1989) (granting immunity to any person operating in accordance with
the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act who manufactures, dis-
penses, sells, gives, or distributes an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo by a
licensed practitioner); id. § 765.10 (withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures
from a patient with terminal conditions). Immunity provides a much greater protection than a
defense. A defendant must proceed to trial before raising a defense. Immunity, however, bars
the prosecution altogether. See, e.g., State v. Cloud, 248 La. 125, 131, 176 So. 2d 620, 622
(1965).
55. FLA. STAT. § 827.04 (1989) ("Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a
child of ... necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who, knowingly or by
culpable negligence, permits physical or mental injury to the child, and in so doing causes great
bodily harm ... to such child, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree .. , ").
56. Id. § 782.04(4) (deeming unlawful the "killing of a human being, when perpetrated
without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of [felony child
abuse]"). The original charge also contained a count of manslaughter, which was dismissed in
light of Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920), where the failure of a parent to provide
medical attention to a severely burned child was not manslaughter. Id. Section 782.07, Florida
Statutes, defines manslaughter as "It]he killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or
culpable negligence of another." (emphasis added).
57. 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 700-01 (14th ed. 1967).
58. M. EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEY TO THE ScRIPTuREs (1971).
59. Id. at 411.
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verges from the traditional Christian understanding that God created
the material world by viewing creation as wholly spiritual. In Chris-
tian Science cosmology, matter is viewed not as created by God, but
as a limited mode of human perception.
Christian Scientists believe that spiritual power, or the power of the
Spirit, can be concretely experienced and rationally understood-that
it is literally present to dissolve the limited views of human beings
and the fears proceeding from them, which, they believe, engender
and are objectified as disease. This obviously constitutes a radically
different approach to healing from that which underlies medical
practice, and neither from the standpoint of Christian Science nor
from that of medicine is it in the best interests of the patient to try to
combine them. 6°
Christian Science practitioners function as both pastor and physi-
cian, allaying patients' sense of fear and helping them to understand
Christian Science thought. Practitioners are church members who re-
ceive intensive training in Christian Science thought. The Mother
Church-the First Church of Christ, Scientist, in Boston-certifies
practitioners, listing their names monthly in church literature. 61
The Hermansons brought in a practitioner and a Christian Science
nurse to help Amy. The prosecution charged that despite the Herman-
sons' apparent compliance with the religious accommodation statute,
the Hermansons were criminally liable, either because the statute itself
was unconstitutional, or because it did not provide a defense to crimi-
nal prosecution. 62
1. Pre-Trial Motions
The State stipulated that the Hermansons were "at all times mate-
rial to the facts in this case, follow[ing] the religious teachings of their
church and rel[ying] upon Christian Science healing in the care and
treatment of Amy Hermanson." 63 For the purpose of the Motion to
Dismiss, the Hermansons therefore argued that section 415.503(8)(f)
60. Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, 309 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1641,
1643 (1983).
61. See, e.g., 107 THE CwasTIA Sci. J. at directory 42-70 (Dec. 1989). Applicants must
demonstrate Christian character and verification of successful healings. Practitioners are paid by
the patients and are required to devote their full time to healing work.
62. See generally Memorandum of Law in Support of the State's Demurrer and Motion to
Declare Florida Statute 415.503(8)(f) Unconstitutional, State v. Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (Fla.
12th Cir. Ct. 1987) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law in Support of the State's Demurrer].
63. Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 4 (restating stipulation of facts for Motion
to Dismiss).
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(renumbered as section 415.503(9)(f) should preclude their prosecu-
tion altogether. They argued that the statute exempted their actions
from the definition of child abuse by providing that such behavior
"may not be considered abusive or neglectful for that reason
alone. . .. "64 Because the stipulated facts did not suggest any reason
other than religious practice for their withholding medical treatment,
the Hermansons argued that the statute should protect them from
prosecution. 65
The State contended that the phrase "for that reason alone" should
be interpreted to defeat the Hermansons' defense.6 Other state courts
have interpreted the phrase "for that reason alone" to mean that, at a
certain point in the progression of an illness, such as when the illness
becomes life-threatening, another "reason" is created that removes
the protection of the accommodation. 67  In Walker v. Superior
Court,61 for example, the California Supreme Court held that the
64. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f) (1989) (emphasis added). The following jurisdictions' statutes
also contain language equivalent to "for that reason alone": Alabama: ALA. CODE §§ 13A-13-6,
24-14-1(2) (1986); Arizona: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1974); Arkansas: ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 12-12-502(3) (1987); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2(b) (West Supp. 1989), CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509.1 (West Supp. 1989), id. § 18950.5 (West 1980); Colorado: CoLo.
REV. STAT. § 14-6-101 (1987), id. § 19-3-103 (Supp. 1988); Delaware: DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §
907 (1983); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1356 (1988); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. §
350-4 (1985); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(n)(1) (Supp. 1988), id. §§ 18-401(2), -1501(3) (1987);
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2053 (Smith-Hurd 1988); Iowa: IOWA CODE §§
232.68(2)(c), 726.6(1)(d) (1989); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.011(6) (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1982); Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. AN. § 14:403(B)(5) (West Supp. 1989); Maine: ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 557 (1983), id. tit. 22, § 4010(1) (Supp. 1988); Massachusetts:
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1989); Michigan: MICH. Con'. LAWS ANN. §
722.634 (West Supp. 1989); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(2)(c) (West Supp. 1989);
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.115.3 (Vernon 1983); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
200.5085, 432B.020(2) (1986); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3 XIX(c) (Supp.
1988), id. § 170-C:5 II (1978); North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989); Okla-
homa: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852A (West Supp. 1989); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
418.740(1)(e) (Butterworth 1987); Pennsylvania: PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2303 (Purdon
Supp. 1989); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-7-16, 7-17.1, 26-10-1.1 (1984);
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-102(1) (1987); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3A-19.5 (1987);
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 682(C) (Supp. 1989); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-314, -
371.1 (1988), id. § 63.1-248.2A2 (1987); Washington: WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3)
(West Supp. 1989); Wisconsin: WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West 1987); Wyoming: Wyo.
STAT. § 14-3-202(vii) (1986).
65. Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 4, at 12 (restating stipulation of facts for
Motion to Dismiss).
66. Memorandum of Law in Support of the State's Demurrer, supra note 62, at 6.
67. See, e.g., People ex rel D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271, 274-75 (Colo. 1982) ("a child who is
treated solely by spiritual means is not, for that reason alone, . . .neglected, but if there is an
additional reason, such as where the child is deprived of medical care necessary to prevent a life-
endangering condition, the child may be adjudicated. . . neglected").
68. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989).
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phrase "for that reason alone" in section 11165.2, California Penal
Code, 69 meant that treatment by prayer alone is not neglect except
when coupled with a sufficiently grave or life-threatening health con-
dition. 70 By contrast, the judge presiding over the Hermanson trial
held that the phrase "for that reason alone" in the Florida statute
refers not to the severity of the illness, but to additional reasons for
the deprivation of medical attention. 7'
The State also contended in the Hermanson trial that the accommo-
dation provision violates the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment. The State argued that the statute impermissibly favors one
religion over another and entangles the court with religion through
determinations of which practice is "legitimate," whether a religion is
"well-recognized," and other issues outside the court's proper juris-
diction. 72 In the alternative, the State contended that the statute does
not provide a criminal defense, but was intended only to apply to the
reporting section in which it appears. 73 In his order of June 16, 1988,
Judge Steven Dakan expressly recognized the statutory accommoda-
tion as a defense7 4 and, without elaboration, rejected the State's
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2(b) (West Supp. 1989); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
18950.5 (West 1980), id. § 16509.1 (West Supp. 1989).
70. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at -_, 763 P.2d at 863-66, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12-15. On February 21,
1984, four-year-old Shauntay Walker became ill with flu-like symptoms and within four days
had developed a stiff neck. She died on March 9 of acute purulent meningitis. Shauntay had
been treated by an accredited practitioner of Christian Science in lieu of medical care. Her
mother, Laurie Walker, was subsequently charged with involuntary manslaughter and felony
child endangerment. After losing her motion to dismiss in the trial court, Laurie petitioned the
court of appeal for a writ of prohibition and a stay, which were summarily denied. Walker v.
Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1090, 222 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Ct. App. 1986), review granted, 715
P.2d 260, 224 Cal. Rptr 340 (1986) (granting petition for review and remanding to the court of
appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ of prohibition), aff'd, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d
852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988) (granting second petition for review and concluding that Mrs.
Walker could be prosecuted as charged), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
71. Judge Dakan ruled during oral argument on the defendants' motion for Judgment of
Acquittal that the phrase "for that reason alone" meant another reason constituting child abuse.
Another reason for withholding medical attention could be willfull disregard for the health of
the child or to prevent medical authorities from discovering signs of physical abuse of the child.
The Christian Science Church originally proposed inclusion of the phrase "for that reason
alone" to clarify that the accommodation would not be available in cases where children were
refused food, clothing, shelter, or were subjected to physical abuse. Telephone interview with
Nathan A. Talbot, Manager, Christian Science Committee on Publication (Sept. 5, 1989).
72. Memorandum of Law in Support of the State's Demurrer, supra note 62, at 11-16.
73. Id.
74. See Order on Motion to Dismiss at 4, State v. Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th Cir.
Ct. 1987) [hereinafter Order on Motion to Dismiss]. But see Walker, where the court found as a
matter of statutory construction that while the exemption in section 270 provides a defense to the
withholding of medical care proscribed in that section, it does not constitute a defense to sec-
tions 273(a) (child endangerment) and 192(b) (manslaughter). "Conduct that is legal in one stat-
utory context . ..may be actionable under separate statutes created for different legislative
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motion to declare the statute unconstitutional.75
After the Florida Legislature passed the amendment to section
415.511 in May 1988,76 creating the grant of criminal immunity, the
Hermansons filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, arguing that the
amendment entitled them to immunity and dismissal of the charges as
a matter of law. This motion also was denied. 77
2. The Evidence at Trial
Following a four-month continuance granted because of extensive
pre-trial publicity, 78 the Hermansons' case went to trial on April 10,
1989, in Sarasota, Florida. The State's case focused on Amy's appear-
ance during September 1986 and on the hours just before she died.
The evidence showed that several of Amy's teachers had become con-
cerned early in September because she seemed listless and thinner. The
Hermansons also were concerned during this time, believing that
Amy's problem was emotional and related to her discontent with a
new school routine.
On the day Amy died, a Christian Science practitioner and a Chris-
tian Science nurse came to Amy's home to care for her. The nurse
testified that Amy was unresponsive from the time of the nurse's arri-
val, and that when Amy began vomiting and her condition worsened,
purposes." Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at -, 763 P.2d at 858-59, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8. The court ex-
pressly overruled People v. Arnold, 66 Cal. 2d 438, 426 P.2d 515, 58 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967), to
the extent that it had found no exemption for parents who used prayer treatment in lieu of
medical care as required in section 270. The court determined that section 270 was enacted for
the purpose of fiscal child support enforcement, as opposed to the parental punishment and
protection from bodily harm purposes of the charged statutes. Walker, 47 Cal. 3d at -, 763
P.2d at 859, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 8. Therefore, because the statutes do not share a legislative objec-
tive, a defendant's exemption under one section does not create a parallel exemption from prose-
cution under the others. Id.; cf. Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 345 Pa. Super. 10, 33, 497 A.2d
616, 628 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that child abuse reporting exemption is not a defense to
manslaughter).
75. Order on Defendant's Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, Nov. 22, 1988, State v. Her-
manson, No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 1987) [hereinafter Order on Supplemental Motion to
Dismiss].
76. Ch. 88-337, § 27, 1988 Fla. Laws 1750, 1781.
77. Order on Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, supra note 75. Defendants raised the same
issues in a writ of prohibition. However, the writ was denied. Hermanson v. Circuit Court of the
Twelfth Judicial Circuit, 536 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
78. Newspapers covered the trial almost on a daily basis. In addition, the night before the
Hermanson trial originally was scheduled to begin, a television news magazine featured a story
involving the similar case of Commonwealth v. Twitchell, No. 89-210 (Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., May
23, 1989). Sixty Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Dec. 4, 1988) (transcript available at Fla.
Dep't of State, Bureau of Archives & Records Management, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee,
Fla.)
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the nurse called for an ambulance. 79 The medical examiner testified
that Amy died from ketoacidosis, a complication of juvenile diabetes,
although some evidence suggested that Amy might have died from as-
pirating vomit.
Finally, the testimony showed that the Hermansons' treatment of
Amy was based on their practice of Christian Science. Christine Her-
manson's sister-in-law, Leslie Morton, testified that she had called the
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on Septem-
ber 29, the day before Amy died, because she knew that the Herman-
sons-in accordance with their religious beliefs-would not take Amy
to a doctor. The State did not introduce any expert evidence concern-
ing the tenets of Christian Science other than a statement from the
Christian Science nurse that she had received no training in the medi-
cal treatment of disease while studying in Boston because the Chris-
tian Science Church teaches spiritual, not medical, treatment. 80
3. Closing Argument
In his closing argument, the State Attorney argued that the Her-
mansons' continued reliance on spiritual healing in the face of Amy's
worsening condition constituted culpable negligence. 8 Essentially, he
told the jury to ignore the religious defense, and to begin their analy-
sis without taking into account the Hermansons' religious beliefs.8 2
This approach was derived from Judge Dakan's June 16, 1988 Order
which stated that "[i]f the State can prove a prima facie case, then
Defendants may present evidence that their actions fell within the de-
fenses provided for them by the law." 83 Therefore, the prosecutor first
argued that from an objective, non-religious viewpoint, the Herman-
sons' actions constituted culpable negligence.8
In response to the Hermanson's affirmative defense based on the
accommodation statute, the State Attorney stressed that the jury had
to decide if the Hermansons had been "legitimately" practicing their
religious beliefs-not sincerely or conscientiously, but "legiti-
mately." 85 This foundation prepared the jury for the State Attorney's
remarkable assertion that Christian Science "allowed" the use of
79. Transcript of Trial at 14-16, Apr. 14, 1989, State v. Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th
Cir. Ct. 1987) (testimony of Mary Jane Sellers).
80. Id. at 2-3.
81. Id. at 10-17, Apr. 18, 1989 (closing arguments).
82. Id.
83. Order on Motion to Dismiss, supra note 74, at 4.
84. Transcript of Trial at 10-17, Apr. 18, 1989, Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (closing argu-
ments).
85. Id. at 21.
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medical treatment . 6 He based this inference on the nurse's call for an
ambulance. Offering no direct testimony about how the nurse's mak-
ing the call related to Christian Science doctrine, he told the jury that
Christian Science includes the use of medicine.8 7 He suggested that
since a Christian Science nurse had called an ambulance when Amy
began to vomit, the Hermansons could have called for medical care at
an earlier time and still have been "legitimately" practicing their reli-
gious beliefs. According to the State Attorney,
these experts in the Church, Mrs. Sellers and Mr. Hillier, recognized
the need for medical attention. And it shows that medical attention
would be allowed and is also recognized in this Church, because
these two people are the ones who recommended it.
What it shows is that the Church does recognize medical help....
These two experts say, "The Church says it's okay to call a doctor."
But the Defendants didn't do it. They could have called for medical
help is what that shows, ladies and gentlemen ....
[T]hey could have called for medical help Monday night when that
child was delirious and vomiting ....
[Tihey could have called for help Sunday night ....
[T]hey could have called for help Tuesday ....
That is not legitimately practicing one's religious beliefs .... That
is culpable negligence ....
What I'm saying to you, contend to you, [is] that the Defendants,
because they could have called a doctor and didn't, were not
legitimately practicing their religious beliefs; and therefore are not
entitled to the defense that they claim ...
[The] Christian Science Church allows medical attention. 8
Thus, without introducing evidence as to whether Christian Science
teaches belief in medical attention, or to Christian Science's view of
turning to medical treatment, the State Attorney posited that "Chris-
tian Science allows medical attention. ' 89 If this assertion was sup-
ported by the evidence, the argument that certain actions did not
86. Id. at 23.
87. Id. at 23-25.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 24-25. The falsity of the prosecutor's argument is underscored by Rita Swan, an
embittered former Christian Scientist who lost her son in 1977 to bacterial meningitis and who
now actively campaigns to eliminate the protection of the accommodation statutes. After the
judge instructed the jury that they were not to decide if the Hermansons had correctly inter-
preted Christian Science, but only whether they held a sincere belief that Christian Science au-
thorized their actions, Swan observed that "[it's farcical to give this case to a jury with those
instructions. The case should have been thrown out a year ago if the only question was if they
were sincere about their religion." Dolnick, Murder by Faith, 41 IN HEALTH 58, 65 (Jan.-Feb.
1990).
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constitute the "legitimate" practice of religion might be dispositive
under many states' Statutes limiting the accommodation to parents
practicing the tenets of a "recognized church or denomination." 9
Florida's statute, however, does not limit its protection to "recog-
nized" denominations. The plain language of the statute simply au-
thorizes the practice of "religious beliefs." 9' Florida's statute does not
require the accommodation of religious beliefs only if to act otherwise
would be considered sin or would result in some kind of excommuni-
cation.9 2 Nor does it require that every member of a religious faith act
or believe in precisely the same manner. 93 It does not even require that
90. See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b) (1986) ("recognized church or religious denom-
ination"); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(d) (Supp. 188) ("recognized church or religious
denomination"); Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-12-502(3) (1987) ("recognized church or re-
ligious denomination"); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) ("recognized church or
'religious denomination"), CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509.1 (West Supp. 1989) ("recognized
church or religious denomination"); Coiorado: COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-103 (Supp. 1988) ("rec-
ognized church or religious demonination");' Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907 (1983)
("recognized church or religious denomination"), id. tit. 11, § 1104 (1987) ("organized church
or religious group"); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1356 (1988) ("recognized
church or religious denomination"); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-4 (1985) ("recognized
church or religious denomination"); Iowa: IowA CODE § 726.6(1)(d) (1989) ("recognized relig-
ious denomination"); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(l)(c) (1988) ("recognized church ot
religious denomination"); Louisiana: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(5) (West Supp. 1989)
("well-recognized religious method"); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp. 1988)
("recognized religious organization"); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, §.1(4)
(West 1989) ("recognized church or religious denomination"); New Hampshire: N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3 XIX (c) (Supp. 1988) ("recognized church or religious denomination"),
id. § 170-C:5 I (1978) ("recognized religious method"); Ohio: Omo REv. CODE ANN. §
2151.421(H) (Anderson Supp. 1988) ("well-recognized religion"), id. § 2919.22(A) (Anderson
1988) C'recognized religious body"); Oklahoma:- OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852A (West Supp.
1989) ("recognized church or religioui denomination");- Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
418.740(1)(e) (Butterworth 1987) ("religious beliefs or practices of child or child's parent or
guardian"); Pennsylvania: PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1989) ("recog-
nized church or religious denomination"); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1
(1984) ("recognized Church"); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-6-1-2(1) (1987) ("recognized
religious method of healing"); Virgiliia: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1 (1988), id. § 62.1-248.2A2
(1987) ("recognized church or religious denomination"); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 49-1-
3(g)(2)(A) (1986) ("recognized religious denomination"); Wyoming: Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-202(vii)
(1986) ("recognized church or religious denomination").
91. See FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f) (1989).
92. See id. In Walker, the California Supreme Court noted that "resort to medicine does
not constitute "sin" for a Christian Scientist .... does not subject a church member to stigma-
tization... , does not result in divine retribution .... and, according to the Church's amicus
curiae brief, is not a matter of church compulsion." Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112,
-, 763 P.2d 852, 870, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 19 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1999) (citing
Schneider, Christian Scienee and the Law: Room for Compromise?, I COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 80, 87-88 (1965); Talbot, The Position of the Christian Science Church, 309 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1641, 1642 (1983)).
93. See FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f) (1989); cf. Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Emp. Sec., 109 S.
Ct. 1514 (1989); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
576 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:559
the parent be a member of a church, in accordance with United States
Supreme Court holdings concerning free exercise of religion. 94
The State Attorney's argument in Hermanson eviscerated any
meaning in the religious accommodation statute. Regardless of the ac-
tual tenets of a church, anyone can choose to act inconsistently with
their religious beliefs at any time. Thus, a Christian Scientist can dis-
regard church teaching and seek medical attention. But, if the statute
protects anyone, it must protect those who remain constant to their
own religious convictions. To suggest that because one Christian Sci-
entist seeks medical help, all Christian Scientists must do so would
render the statute meaningless. Individuals can abandon their faith,
but if abandonment of faith becomes the standard to avoid criminal
liability, then the accommodation statute applies to no one.
4. The Jury Questions
After one and one-half hours of deliberation, the jury requested an-
swers to the following three questions: (1) Does the practice of Chris-
tian Science "allow" its believers to go to doctors; (2) Must Christian
Scientists obtain permission from the Mother Church in Boston be-
fore seeking medical attention; and (3) Does Christian Science "al-
low" its believers to seek medical treatment at a certain point in the
progression of disease. 95 These questions demonstrate the jury's uncer-
tainty about whether the evidence actually supported the State Attor-
ney's assertion. They also demonstrate that the jury made the kind of
inquiry into orthodoxy forbidden by the United States Supreme
Court. 96 The jurors' questions reveal their reliance on the State's argu-
ment that because Christian Science "allows" medical treatment, the
Hermansons were culpably negligent in not calling in a doctor, not-
withstanding the fact that they were providing spiritual treatment in
accordance with the statute. This reasoning requires that at some
point in the progression of a disease, "reasonable" people will aban-
94. See Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (holding that proper interpretation of religious beliefs not
within the judicial function); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding that jury may
not question reasonableness of defendant's beliefs); cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that courts cannot re-
solve disputes that necessarily require the civil courts to weigh the significance and meaning of
religious doctrines).
95. See Transcript of Trial at 2, Apr. 18, 1989, State v. Hermanson (No. 86-3231) (Fla.
12th Cir. Ct. 1987) (questions from jury). With the assent of the parties, the court responded
that the jury must look to the evidence presented during the trial to find the answers. See id. at
2-6.
96. See infra notes 98-110 and accompanying text.
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don their religious beliefs, 97 especially when other members of the
same faith can be shown to have abandoned their beliefs under similar
circumstances.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The accommodation of free exercise of religion raises constitutional
questions concerning the proper scope of judicial inquiry into the
"reasonableness" or uniformity of religious belief, the possibility that
accommodations of the free exercise of religion violate the establish-
ment clause, and the failure of statutory accommodations to provide
fair warning of criminal liability.
A. Ballard Analysis
If the jury decided that the Hermansons unreasonably persisted in
their faith, their decision violates the Hermansons' right to free exer-
cise of religion as defined by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Ballard.9
The defendants in Ballard were accused of defrauding people by
claiming to have special messages or visions from God. 99 The Supreme
Court held that the jury could not decide whether certain beliefs were
themselves unreasonable. 00 The jury could, however, determine
whether the defendants sincerely believed what they professed. 0' In
other words, the jury could not decide if the beliefs were "true," but
only whether the defendants truly believed them. 02 Accordingly, the
Hermansons' jury could consider the Hermansons' religious beliefs
only to determine whether the defendants were sincerely practicing
their faith.
The Supreme Court expanded Ballard's protection of free exercise
rights in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Secu-
97. This is esentially California's test, based on the holding in Walker v. Superior Court, 47
Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989).
98. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
99. Id. at 79-80.
100. Id. at 86.
101. Id. Justice Jackson dissented from the majority's holding that the jury instructions had
sufficiently prevented the forbidden inquiry. He found that a jury's consideration of what is
believable necessarily focuses on the perceived truth or falsity of the claimed beliefs. See id. at
92-93 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
102. Professor Laurence Tribe characterizes the question left for the jury to decide in Walker
as "whether it was unreasonable for [the defendant] to leave her faith in God and to persist in
relying on prayer alone, pursuant to the express authorization in California Penal Code section
270, when her daughter remained sick." See Tribe Petition, supra note 8, at 4. Tribe argues that
such an inquiry is unconstitutional under the free exercise clause of the first amendment. See id.
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rity Division.0 3 Different members of Thomas' sect disagreed whether
their religion made it sinful to work in a munitions factory. 0 4 To in-
voke the free exercise clause,'0 5 the Court required only that Thomas
show an "honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his re-
ligion." 6 The Court held that judicial tribunals may not decide
whether a person's religious beliefs are
acceptable, logical, consistent or comprehensible .... [T]he
guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared
by all of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive
area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to
inquire whether a petitioner . . . more correctly perceived the
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation. 107
In Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,0 the Su-
preme Court further refined Ballard. Frazee was denied unemploy-
ment benefits because he refused to take a job which would require
him to work on Sundays. The Department of Employment Security's
Board of Review denied his claim because Frazee was not a member
of a religious group and his conviction was not based on the "tenets
or dogma accepted by the individual of some church, sect, or denomi-
nation,"' 0 9 but rather was purely personal. The Supreme Court re-
jected this position.
Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination,
especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to work on
Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held
religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to claim the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause, one must be responding to the
commands of a particular religious organization."'0
The lesson of Thomas and Frazee is that the states may not grant re-
ligious accommodation by narrowly defining orthodox faith.
103. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
104. Id. at 710.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
106. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
107. Id. at 714-16; see also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Pres-
byterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that courts may not weigh the significance and
meaning of religious doctrines).
108. 109 S..Ct. 1514 (1989).
109. Id. at 1516.
110. Id. at 1517.
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In Hermanson, the prosecutor framed the jury question with the
accommodation statute's own wording: "Were the Hermansons
'legitimately' practicing Christian Science?""' Because the Christian
Science nurse called for the ambulance, the jury may have determined
that the "legitimate" practice of Christian Science allows the use of
medicine; or that the Hermanson's were not "legitimately" practicing
Christian Science. Yet no evidence introduced at trial refuted the Her-
mansons' claim that they were sincerely practicing Christian Science.
The evidence merely showed that one member of their religion, on one
occasion, called for an ambulance. Moreover, this one person, in
three years of Christian Science nursing training in Boston, did not
receive any "medical" instruction."12 This evidence does not even rise
to the level of a disagreement over "legitimate" church doctrine.
However, even if it did, the free exercise clause does not permit judi-
cial preference for one interpretation of faith over another,"3 judicial
determination that a particular interpretation of faith is more "legiti-
mate" than another," 4 or judicial inquiry into the "reasonableness"
of a religious belief or practice." 5
B. Mandatory Accommodation
Although the right to freedom of belief is absolute, the government
may impose restrictions on "religious" conduct. For example, in Rey-
nolds v. United States," 6 the right of free exercise of religion was held
not to be a defense to polygamy." 7 Subsequent cases have held that
religious beliefs do not constitute a blanket defense to criminal prose-
cution."'
However, the states must accommodate the free exercise of religion
in some instances. In Wisconsin v. Yoder," 9 the Court required Wis-
consin to accommodate the free exercise rights of the Amish by allow-
ing them to remove their children from public school when they
111. Transcript of Trial at 20-21, Apr. 18, 1989, State v. Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th
Cir. Ct. 1987) (closing argument).
112. Id. at 21, Apr. 14, 1989 (nurse's testimony).
113. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
114. Frazee, 109 S. Ct. 1514 (1989).
115. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
116. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
117. Id. at 167.
118. See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S.
660 (1988) (remand to state court necessary to clarify whether religious use of peyote accommo-
dated by state criminal statute prior to federal constitutional analysis), on remand, 307 Or. 68,
763 P.2d 148 (1988) (first amendment protects the religious use of peyote), cert. granted, 109 S.
Ct. 1526 (1989).
119. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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complete the eighth grade. 20 Wisconsin argued that such an accom-
modation would conflict with the first amendment guarantee that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion.''2 The Court acknowledged that granting the Amish an excep-
tion to state school attendance laws might violate the establishment
clause by implicitly approving their religious choice to take their chil-
dren out of school after the eighth grade. However, the Court con-
cluded that the danger of violating the establishment clause "cannot
be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to
the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise." 22
When a state wishes to serve a compelling state interest by burden-
ing freedom of religion, it must do so in the least restrictive manner
possible. 23 Given the State's compelling interest in preventing child
abuse and preserving family life, the relevant question becomes
whether the state's approach is the least restrictive possible. The
State's present approach, embodied in section 415.503(9), Florida Sta-
tutes, requires that spiritual healing cases accommodated under the
statute be reported to HRS. 2 4 This approach allows for judicial inter-
vention and complies with federal guidelines.125 Although court-
ordered medical care would interfere significantly with parental rights
to make major family decisions, and would burden the family's reli-
gious practice, 26 it imposes a far lighter burden than the threat of
criminal prosecution. It thus constitutes a less restrictive alternative to
serve the State's interest.
The California Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary is puz-
zling. In Walker, 27 the court found that the imposition of criminal
penalties on parents providing spiritual care for their children would
be less intrusive than loss of custody. "[I]t is not clear that parents
would prefer to lose custody of their children pursuant to a disruptive
and invasive judicial inquiry than to face privately the prospect of
criminal liability.' ' 28 Even the temporary loss of custody appears sig-
nificantly less severe from the family's standpoint than criminal prose-
120. Id. at 234.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
122. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
123. Id. at 214.
124. FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f)(1) (1989).
125. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(i) (1987).
126. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 518 (1925) ("It is not seriously debat-
able that the parental right to guide one's child intellectually and religiously is a most substantial
part of the liberty and freedom of the parent").
127. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989).
128. Id. at -, 763 P.2d at 871, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
RELIGIOUS A CCOMMODA TION
cution. Florida's statute and the federal guidelines do not impose a
loss of custody, but rather impose only court-ordered medical treat-
ment. 129 Social service intervention and subsequent medical treatment
best serve the state's interest in protecting children and their families.
Such an approach is less burdensome than an emotionally and finan-
cially devastating criminal prosecution following a child's death.
Thus, criminal prosecution after the death of a child is neither the
least restrictive nor the most narrowly tailored means of serving the
State's interest in preventing child abuse and preserving family life. 130
C. Permissive Accommodation
In many instances, legislatures have enacted religious accommoda-
tion statutes to protect the constitutional right of free exercise of reli-
gion. 3' When such a statute is challenged as an impermissible
establishment of religion, the Supreme Court generally relies on the
three-prong test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.3 2 Under the first
prong of the Lemon test, the Court examines whether the statute has a
secular purpose. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has analyzed and af-
firmed the secular purpose of statutes that accommodate religious
freedom, stating that the purpose of these statutes is to guarantee fun-
damental first amendment rights, and therefore that they do not con-
travene the establishment clause. 133
The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the primary ef-
fect of the statute is to establish religion, or, as Justice O'Connor sug-
gests, to endorse religion. 134 Accommodations discussed in this Article
do not endorse religion, but serve to distinguish the intent tradition-
ally associated with child abuse from the intent of parents who simply
choose one form of treatment over another. This accommodation
does not work to establish any religion, but rather recognizes that
''government's actions impinge on different persons in dramatically
129. See FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f)(3) (1989); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(2)(i) (1987).
130. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 415.502 (1989) (stating that intent of statute is to prevent further
harm to the child or any other children living in the home and to preserve the family life of the
parents and children).
131. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320C-1 1 (1982) (providing exemptions for Christian Science san-
itoriums); id. § 1369a (1982) (providing state plans for medical assistance); id. § 1369g (1982)
(providing state programs for licensing of administrators of nursing homes); 10 id. § 1079 (1982)
(dealing with contracts for medical care for spouses and children).
132. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
133. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Con-
nor defined an "accommodation" statute as one which "lifts a government-imposed burden on
the free exercise of religion." Id. Florida's statute clearly falls within this definition by lifting the
burden of criminal liability.
134. Id. at 76.
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different ways, so that truly even-handed treatment at times compels
exempting those whose religious beliefs are exceptionally burdened by
a challenged state action."' 35 The primary effect of the accommoda-
tion, therefore, is to assure even-handed treatment for all parents who
choose health care, either spiritual or medical, for their children,
while reserving criminal penalties for those who willfully neglect and
mistreat their children. 13 6
Some statutes, however, may not withstand direct constitutional at-
tack where they express state preference for one group over other sim-
ilar groups. The United States Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another." 3 7 Most of
the state statutes grant an accommodation for parents who provide
treatment by "a duly accredited practitioner" in lieu of medical treat-
ment.3 8 While Christian Science accredits practitioners to care for
persons who are ill, other groups may rely on more informal, individ-
ual means of spiritual care. 39 Strictly interpreted, statutes requiring
the use of a "duly accredited practitioner" deny accommodation to
members of groups that do not "accredit" someone called a "practi-
tioner." Constitutional neutrality toward religion prohibits state pref-
erence for religions that practice spiritual healing through "accredited
practitioners," such as Christian Science, over those that do not.140
135. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 821 (1978).
136. Statutes that equally accommodate all religions relying on spiritual healing should be
constitutionally valid, just as the equal accommodation of other particular types of religious
practice has been approved in a variety of settings. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Em-
ployment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding accommodation of believer who could not
work in munitions factory constitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding
accommodation of Amish practice constitutional); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(holding accommodation of Sabbath observance constitutional).
137. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
138. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b) (1986); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §
47.17.020(d) (Supp. 1988); Arizona: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1974); Arkansas: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-12-502(3) (1987); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 16509.1 (West Supp. 1989); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103 (Supp.
1988); Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 907 (1983); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-1356 (1988); Florida: FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f)(3) (1989); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-4
(1985); Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp. 1988); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1989); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 169-C:3
XIX(c) (Supp. 1988); Pennsylvania: PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2203 (Purdon Supp. 1989);
South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-1.1 (1984); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
314 (1988); Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3) (West Supp. 1989); Wyoming:
WYO. STAT. § 14-3-202(vii) (1986).
139. For example, the Bible teaches that when someone is ill they should "call for the elders
of the church, and let them pray over him, annointing him with oil in the name of the Lord."
James 5:14 (New American Standard 1963).
140. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that states may not
"pass laws which aid one religion" or "prefer one religion over another").
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Section 270, California Penal Code, provides an accommodation
based on the stature of a parent's religion as "recognized" or part of
a "denomination. ' 14' In addition, the religion must provide spiritual
care through the services of a "duly accredited practitioner."'' 42 The
statute arguably excludes from its coverage those whose religious be-
liefs are not "recognized," "denominational," or administered by a
"duly accredited practitioner." This description apparently applies
only to Christian Science. Therefore, the statutes specifically naming
Christian Science, or implicitly referring to it through the phrase
"duly accredited practitioner," arbitrarily prefer one religion over
others similarly situated.
43
The third prong of the Lemon test forbids statutes that "excessively
entangle" the government with religion.'" In State v. Miskimens, 45
the court held that the accommodation statute provided a defense, but
considered it to be an unconstitutional establishment of religion.
[I]t has been apparent throughout this trial that the second sentence
of R.C. 2919.22(A) hopelessly involves the state in the determination
of questions which should not be the subject of governmental
inquisition and potential public ridicule - questions such as what is
a "recognized religious body," by whom must it be "recognized,"
for how long must it have been "recognized," what are its tenets,
did the accused act in accordance with those tenets, what are
"spiritual means," and what is the effect of combining some prayer
with some treatment or medicine. The determination of such issues
runs clearly afoul of at least one recognized test for determining an
impermissible establishment problem, i.e., the "excessive
entanglement" test .... 46
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected such a broad application
of the excessive entanglement test. The Court stated in Lemon that the
141. For text, see supra note 27.
142. Id.
143. See Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186 (1989). Justice Mosk, who wrote the majority opinion, also penned
a concurrence in which he found that the accommodation in California Penal Code section 270
established a preference among religions and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at -, 763 P.2d
at 874-78, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 22-27. But see Williams, Christian Science and the Care of Children:
The Constitutional Issues, in CHURCH & STATE (Sept. 1989) (asserting that Christian Science
should be afforded statutory accommodation because of its "creditable record" of efficacy); cf.
TEx. CODE ANN. § 22.04 (Vernon 1989) (providing affirmative defense for practice of "recog-
nized religious method of healing with a generally accepted record of efficacy").
144. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
145. 22 Ohio Misc. 2d 43, 490 N.E.2d 931 (1984).
146. Id. at 46, 490 N.E.2d at 934.
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purpose of the excessive entanglement query is "to prevent, as far as
possible, the intrusion of either [church or state] into the precincts of
the other.'14 7 "Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize
that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is blurred, indis-
tinct, and [a] variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a
particular relationship.'1 48 In Lemon, the Court held unconstitutional
statutes granting state aid to church-related schools through programs
"whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of adminis-
tration."'' 49 However, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' s° the Court extensively
detailed the tenets and religious practice of the Amish and expressly
found that the accommodation of their beliefs did not violate the es-
tablishment clause.' 5 ' Therefore, fact-based inquiry by the courts into
the tenets of a religion does not implicate prohibited entanglement
through administrative schemes or intrusion into church doctrine.
Furthermore, Florida's accommodation statute does not require a
determination of whether a religion is recognized, only whether the
defendant was "legitimately" practicing religious beliefs. Thus, Flori-
da's accommodation statute does not violate the establishment clause.
D. Due Process
In Mourning v. Family Publications Service,5 2 the Supreme Court
stated that the objective of due process is "to ensure that no individ-
ual is convicted unless a fair warning has been first given to the world
in language that the common world will understand what the law in-
tends to do if a certain line is passed.""' Florida's accommodation
statute is constitutionally deficient because it authorizes reliance on
spiritual healing without fairly warning that the authorization may be
withdrawn and criminal charges brought for child abuse if a child's
illness threatens permanent damage or death. The statute fails to give
citizens clear guidelines for legal conduct. A state criminal prohibition
deprives a person of the fair warning-"the first essential of due proc-
ess"-if people "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."'15 4 When a statute imposes
criminal penalties or burdens constitutionally protected rights, a
heightened requirement of fair warning applies.'"
147. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
148. Id.
149. Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970)).
150. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
151. Id. passim.
152. 411 U.S. 356 (1973).
153. Id. at 375.
154. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
155. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).
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By authorizing conduct in one statute,'5 6 but declaring that same
conduct criminal under another statute,157 the State trapped the Her-
mansons, who had no fair warning that the State would consider their
conduct criminal. Under the current statutory scheme, the State con-
tinues to send mixed signals. Yet because these statutes concern the
free exercise of religion, greater clarity than is otherwise required is
necessary to ensure fair warning.'
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REVISING FLORIDA'S ACCOMMODATION STATUTE
Florida should amend section 415.503, Florida Statutes, in order to
give fair warning to those who rely on its accommodation of religion
in caring for their children. In 1975, the Florida Legislature sent a
clear signal to Christian Scientists and members of other religious
sects who provide spiritual care in lieu of medical treatment that their
reliance on spiritual treatment would not subject them to criminal lia-
bility. By prosecuting parents for making the very choice that the ac-
commodation statute authorized, the state violates its duty to fairly
warn parents about the conduct that would subject them to criminal
liability.
A. Limitation for Life-Threatening Illness
As interpreted by the courts, the protection of the accommodation
statutes is currently limited to non-life-threatening illnesses. 15 9 Modifi-
cation of the statute to reflect the current state of the law would sat-
isfy the due process fair warning requirement. To this end, Florida's
statute could be amended to include the phrase: "this accommodation
is not available when the illness threatens permanent physical damage
or becomes life-threatening."16o
However, this approach fails to protect parents if the severity of an
illness cannot be readily detected. As revealed in testimony during the
Hermanson trial, a doctor at an emergency room diagnosed flu in a
young man who two days later died of ketoacidosis1 61 Many illnesses
156. See FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(f) (1989).
157. See id. §§ 782.04(4) , 827.04.
158. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
159. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
160. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1130B (West 1987) (providing that child not endangered
if parent in good faith selects spiritual means of healing, but that "medical care shall be pro-
vided where permanent physical damage could result to such child"); cf. Note, supra note 3, at
417 (proposing amendment requiring medical care "where permanent physical damage could
result'').
161. In a line of questioning concerning the diagnosis of diabetes, the medical examiner testi-
fied that during the previous month a young man who had quit taking his insulin had been seen
by a doctor at a local emergency room. He was diagnosed as having the flu and sent home. Two
days later he died from ketoacidosis, a complication of juvenile diabetes.
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progress swiftly or appear to be milder, non-lethal forms of diseases,
especially to the untrained eye. In People ex rel D.L.E. ,162 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court determined that the condition of an epileptic
child was not life-threatening, and therefore that the mother did not
neglect the child when she took him off medication. 163 Only after a
second trip through the Colorado court system did the supreme court
decide that the child's condition was life-threatening. 64
Because the above revision would authorize parents to rely on spiri-
tual means of healing only so long as an illness was not life-threaten-
ing, in some cases parents might think that their conduct was
authorized when in fact an illness had become serious. Parents who
believe that spiritual methods are superior to medical treatment might
persist in relying on prayer beyond the time when a life-threatening
condition could be halted. Christian Science parents essentially would
be required to believe that a disease is life-threatening when their reli-
gious faith tells them otherwise.
Although this modification would maintain the legal effect given to
the statute in the Hermanson case, and by courts across the country, it
would not eliminate fair warning problems. Parents trained in spiri-
tual healing might still have difficulty deciding when an illness be-
comes life-threatening. The practical effect would be to leave parents
relying on spiritual healing in the same position as other parents: pros-
ecution would result only when a child died or suffered permanent
injury due to a failure to provide medical care. Nevertheless, the
above revision maintaining the accommodation for less serious condi-
tions would have one positive result: parents relying on spiritual heal-
ing for routine health maintenance would not be labeled "child
abusers."
B. Statutory Modification to Grant Immunity
In the aftermath of the Hermanson case, two states have amended
their child abuse laws to strengthen their religious accommodation for
parents relying on spiritual healing. 65 In Minnesota, the Legislature
considered the Hermanson case before amending two sections of the
criminal code. As amended, the definition of "neglect" includes in-
stances in which a child is not provided with "health care."' 6 How-
162. 614 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980).
163. Id. at 874-75.
164. 645 P.2d 271, 276 (Colo. 1982).
165. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (West 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 603.378 (West
Supp. 1989).
166. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 603.378 (West Supp. 1989).
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ever, the statute further provides that "[ilf a parent, guardian, or
caretaker responsible for the child's care in good faith selects and de-
pends upon spiritual means or prayer for treatment or care of disease
or remedial care of the child, this treatment or care is "health care"
for the purposes of this clause.'1
67
Ohio now provides express immunity from criminal liability for a
parent or guardian when "solely in the practice of his religious beliefs,
he fails to provide adequate medical or surgical care or treatment for
the child." 168 The amendment also allows the State to intervene to give
medical care "to a child when his health requires that he be provided
with medical or surgical care or treatment." 1 69
Florida should follow the lead of these states by revising section
415.503(9)(f) to unmistakably grant immunity from criminal prosecu-
tion for parents who act in accordance with the accommodation.
1. Incorporation of the Grant of Immunity
By incorporating the grant of immunity found in section 415.511,
Florida Statutes, into the religious exemption, the Legislature could
strengthen its mandate that these religious practices do not constitute
child abuse. Such an amendment should provide express directions
concerning what evidence would support a defense of immunity. For
example, in the Hermansons' case the parties debated the meaning of
the phrase "for that reason alone." In Walker v. Superior Court, 70
the California Supreme Court held that when a condition became
grave or life-threatening, another "reason" was introduced so as to
defeat the exemption.' 71 Although the judge presiding over the Her-
manson case rejected this interpretation, other Florida courts may ad-
here to this construction. For this reason, the Legislature should
define the phrase "for that reason alone" as having no purpose for
withholding medical treatment other than a religious purpose, absent
any actual, statutorily defined abuse. Such a legislative definition
would assure consistent judicial interpretations.
The Legislature should affirmatively grant immunity to parents
such as the Hermansons by amending the religious accommodation
statute as follows: following the provisions allowing court interven-
167. Id.
168. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.03 (West 1989).
169. Id.
170. 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3186
(1989).
171. Id. at , 763 P.2d at 863-66, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 12-15. See generally supra notes 66-71
and accompanying text.
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tion to order medical or spiritual care for a child, an express grant of
immunity should be provided. Unless a prosecutor demonstrates that
a parent or other person has withheld medical care for a reason other
than the practice of their religious beliefs, the prosecution should be
barred.
2. Substitute "'Sincerely" for "Legitimately"
When the State Attorney asked the Hermanson jurors to determine
whether the defendants had been practicing their religious beliefs "le-
gitimately," he encouraged them to make the kind of inquiry into re-
ligious orthodoxy prohibited by United States v. Ballard.172 As
reflected by the jurors' questions midway through their delibera-
tions, 173 the case turned on whether Christian Science "allows" the
use of medical treatment. Essentially, the jury determined that the
Hermansons had not complied with what the jury had decided was
orthodox Christian Science practice. Yet the undisputed evidence
showed that Christian Science teaches reliance on spiritual healing in
lieu of medical care. The proper inquiry under the existing statute
should simply be whether defendants "sincerely" or in "good faith"
relied on spiritual healing.
Even though evidence not introduced in the Hermanson trial sug-
gests that Christian Science does not condemn members for turning to
medical treatment, the teachings of Thomas and Frazee limit judicial
inquiry to whether the defendants were sincerely following what they
believed to be a tenet of their religion. Otherwise, the finder of fact
determines ex post facto what is orthodox in a defendant's religion.
Therefore, the Florida religious exemption should be amended to
read as follows: "a parent or other person responsible for the child's
welfare sincerely practicing his religious beliefs, who by reason thereof
does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, may not be
considered abusive or neglectful . .. ."
3. Draft of Proposed Revisions
The Florida Legislature should amend section 415.503(9)(f) in the
following manner:
a parent or other person responsible for the child's welfare
logi et-,4 sincerely practicing his or her religious beliefs, who by
172. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
173. Transcript of Trial at 2, Apr. 18, 1989, State v. Hermanson, No. 86-3231 (Fla. 12th Cir.
Ct. 1987) (jury questions).
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reason thereof does not provide specified medical treatment for a
child, may not be considered abusive or neglectful -for-4h -reasn-
alone if such religious reason is the only reason for not seeking
medical attention, but such an exception does not:
1. Eliminate the requirement that such a case be reported to the
department;
2. Prevent the department from investigating such a case; or
3. Preclude a court from ordering, when the health of the child
requires it, the provision of medical services by a physician, as
defined herein,-e-teat-men -by--& dely- aec-edi d--pr-aetionef
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Absent evidence that a parent or other person responsible for the
child has withheld medical care for a reason other than the practice
of their religious beliefs, this section confers immunity from criminal
prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that
government . . . effect no favoritism among sects . . . and that it
work deterrence of no religious belief. 1 5
Under the current interpretations by the Florida and California
courts, parents treating their children with spiritual care in reliance on
the religious accommodation statutes may be found guilty for not
abandoning those religious beliefs at an undetermined point in the
progression of an illness. Such a point can frequently be identified
only in hindsight, even for the parent not acting in accordance with
religious beliefs. Families who rely on spiritual healing need a more
certain standard to guide their daily decisions. The religious accom-
modation statutes of Florida, California, and a majority of other
states should be revised to actually provide the immunity from prose-
cution that in so many recent cases has turned out to be an illusion.
The statutory revisions emphasized above should give the courts
guidance in properly enforcing the grant of immunity. The Florida
174. Additional reference to court-ordered spiritual treatment, while bolstering the legiti-
macy of such treatment through official authorization, runs afoul of the establishment clause by
authorizing the court to order treatment by a "duly accredited practitioner" of a well-recognized
church or organization. See generally supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text.
175. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 303, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring).
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Legislature has an urgent responsibility to clarify the criminal liability
of those who rely on these statutory accommodations. The Herman-
sons have suffered years of anguish and a disruption of their family
life because of their prosecution. Revision of the accommodation stat-
ute to clarify its protection from criminal liability can ensure that their
experience is not repeated.
